Continuing the story of my late Dad's Lancaster Squadron to the end of hostilities in 1945.
On 4th April, 153 squadron were ordered to supply 5 aircraft for 'Gardening', as minelaying operations were known, and every other available machine for a 'maximum effort' night attack on the oil refinery at Leutzkendorf. Take-off by the 12 crews was timed to allow this long flight to be made in complete darkness. Cloud over the target was slight, allowing accurate marking and bombing although results were later assessed as only moderate. The attack was delivered from 12,500 feet; above the light flak barrage, and below the heavy flak busting at 15,000 feet! On all aircraft on the Lutzkendorf raid safely returning to Scampton, crews encountered a low cloud base with limited visibility hampering safe landing, but murky as it was, nothing could match the gloom pervading their debriefings, when told of the losses on the gardening ops
In the Kattegat there are very few deep-water channels suited to larger vessels, and these were well known to both contestants. Knowing just where the mines had to be dropped, enabled the Germans to vector their night-fighters to best effect. The islands of Laesó and Anholt housed air defence controllers and radar stations. Neutral Sweden, with no need to operate a black-out, lay to the east of the bomber's route; German fighters came up, hidden by the darkened background of occupied Denmark, to seek out the bombers which were silhouetted against the lights of Swedish towns. Clearly, the advantages lay with the defenders.
Gardening drops were conducted by individual attacks -albeit conforming to an overall design - without the cover that a bomber stream of many aircraft would provide, so crews felt themselves cruelly exposed to any enemy action. The German defences were often augmented by the addition of naval and other gunships, which, with ability to fire predicted flak at these individual targets, proved to be very accurate. Given their mobility they could be encountered almost anywhere along the bomber's route.
3rd April - Samsó Belt, Southern Kattegat
Aware of the growing disquiet among the crews ordered to fly Gardening Operations, which he judged was having an insidious effect on Squadron morale, W/Co Powley put himself on the Battle Order for this attack, by captaining S/Ldr Gee's crew. In showing that he was prepared to share the dangers, he not only sought to inspire confidence but also demonstrated true leadership qualities. Arthur Allan recalls that at an earlier briefing, Francis Powley had said that "153 Squadron was going through a rough spell, but things would improve". He was however apprehensive. In his book "Wingspan", John Gee quotes W/Co Powley as saying "I have been worried about this operation for the past few days and I have a premonition about it. If I had the guts I would take myself off the Order of Battle, but if I did I would never again be able to look the squadron in the face". These were fateful words.
Major Werner Husemann, 2nd left.
Patrolling the Samsó Belt that night in JU88 - Code Letter D5+AL - was Major Werner Husemann, the commander of I/NJG 3 (First Squadron, Night Fighter Unit #3), and a skilled night fighter with 30 plus kills to his credit. Over the designated drop area, although very dark, the sky was clear and visibility moderate. Flak was non-existent, leaving the path clear for the night-fighters. Major Husemann proceeded to destroy Lancasters RA 544 (P4-2ndU) flown by Wing Commander Powley and also NX 563 (P4-2ndR) flown by F/Lt Arthur Winder. (2ndU was on its first operational mission; 2ndR was on its fourth). Both aircraft are known to have crashed into the Kattegat. There were no survivors.
Airborne 1907 4th Apr '45 from Scampton for a mining operation in the Kattegat (Silverthorne Area). Lost without trace. All are commemorated on the Runnymede Memorial.
F/L A.J.Winder KIA , Sgt G.E.Thomas KIA, F/O L.C.Turner KIA , F/O E.O.Griffith KIA, F/S J.B.Coffey KIA, F/O A.S.Blake KIA, Sgt I.A.Birrell KIA
W/C F.S.Powley, DFC, AFC, KIA, Sgt C.F.Sadler KIA, F/S L.G.Sims KIA, F/S W.Higgins KIA, W/O A.s.Dickson RAAF KIA, F/S C.Madden KIA, F/S R.Neal KIA.
W/C Powley had been No.153 Sqdn Commander since taking up the appointment 7Oct44 when the Squadron was first formed. W/C Powley was a Canadian from Kelowna in British Colombia. He had joined the pre-war RAF on a Short Service Commission circa 1936. His Service number shows he was a contemporary of the legendary W/C Guy Gibson VC.
In his book 'Wingspan', S/Ldr John Gee relates how this particular operation repeatedly fluctuated between ON and OFF thereby underlining the precarious balance inherent in operational flying - had the operation not twice been 'scrubbed' W/Co Powley would not have been involved in it. Fate determined otherwise. { He initially put himself down for the op but had to remove himself when it was rescheduled he was on duty as deputy station commander, but then put himself back ON when this 2nd date was again cancelled} Strangely enough, the crew of F/Lt Winder (also lost that night) were in an identical position. F/Lt Tobin recalled that he was originally selected to fly this operation, but when it was first ordered his navigator was suffering from ear trouble and was refused medical clearance to fly. Consequently, F/O Winder and crew were put ON instead, and remained there even after the ear trouble had cleared up.
Wing Commander Powley flew with S/L Gee's crew on several occasions - as a 'relief' for S/L Gee, who having already completed one tour of 30 ops would have been on a 'reduced' second tour. This helped built up the crews ops totals but allowed Gee to remain with the crew across all of their first tour of ops. On this fateful night S/L Gee remained behind acting as Officer In Charge Of Flying. He remembered later.
"The five Lancasters took off and set out on their journey to the Kattegat. I was so worried {due to W/C Powleys premonition} I did not know where to put myself. The night seemed endless. As the time drew near for their return I went to Flying Control to hear them call up as they entered the circuit. Three of the lancaster turned up and landed but there was no sign of the other two. Wing Commander Powley and my crew in U for Uncle and F/Lt Arthur winder and his crew of R for Roger were missing. In one night I had lost my crew, my Squadron Commander and one of my Flight Lieutenants. I was absolutely distraught. I could not bear to speak to anyone. I went to bed but could not sleep. Bob Purves, who had flown on the op came into my room and tried to console me.
The next day I had the terrible task of having to write to the homes of all my crew and trying to console their parents. I was unable to say much about the operation but I knew they would all be wondering why their sons were missing when I was still at Scampton. I was so terribly sad to have lost my crew and my friend and station commander. The Squadron had been badly mauled"
It can be seen that Gardening operations were not welcomed by aircrew, who tried to stoically accept that they were more hazardous than other operations. Many however dreaded the fact that flights were made almost entirely over water, and invariably in total darkness. Should the aircraft be shot down or seriously crippled, the chances of survival were so negligible as to be non-existent. To carry out a successful 'ditching' at night would require phenomenal luck for even the most highly-skilled pilot, and the prospect of a subsequent launching of the dinghy in total darkness into a hostile sea, heavily encumbered by full flying kit, did not bear thinking about. Over land, crews could take their chances with a parachute jump, over water, even if successful, this would result in certain death from exposure. As with sailors on Russian convoy duties, the survival time in northern waters during the winter months was unlikely to exceed two minutes. { My father, a keen fisherman, was in absolute dread of deep water for the rest of his life and confined himself to mainly river fishing. Even a loch could cause him deep anxiety and a choice of fishing solely from the bank rather than join us grey faced to fish from a boat.}
Given the shattering outcome of the night's activities, it was perhaps just as well for Squadron morale that there were no more Gardening Operations. The Squadron had mounted 34 effective sorties in sowing just 203 mines, but had suffered a beating in losing 27 of its most experienced aircrew including its well respected and popular Commanding Officer, together with 4 aircraft (plus two more requiring extensive repairs). No longer leading a crew, S/Ldr Gee was also posted out, creating further disruption in the Squadron's leadership structure and impact onto squadron morale at losing yet another respected officer.
Lacking any means to assess the effectiveness of their sea-mining operations and therefore to come to terms with their losses, it was undoubtedly a heavy price that the Squadron had paid.
The crews mourned their losses not knowing that the Squadrons final offensive mission was now less than four short weeks away.
